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In the Bible, the human God-relationship is typically established through and by the 
phenomenon of 'calling'. However, for much subsequent theology, this has been displaced by 
'vision', 'taste' or 'feeling'. Referring to the notion of an inner word, the paper follows 
Kierkegaard's treatment of silence as, alternatively, a mode of inattention and attention to 
such an inner word.  With Heidegger, the paper turns to the notion of vocation, both as in the 
discussion of the call of conscience in Being and Time and the poetic vocation exemplified in 
the figure and poetry of Hölderlin. Finally, it considers the possible difference between such a 
poetic vocation and a divine calling. 
 
Introduction 
As we shall see in more detail, the idea that the way in which God communicates with human 
beings is a kind of speaking is deeply rooted in the Bible and in Christian tradition. On this 
view, Christian life is essentially a response to the divine calling. However, the modern 
experience of God, or, more precisely, of God’s absence, renders this model problematic. 
Indeed, on Kierkegaard’s analysis of the present age, human speech is itself caught up in a 
process of progressive degradation. For all his distance from ‘the crowd’, the Kierkegaardian 
aesthete provides a clear statement of the view that, in the end, speech is indistinguishable 
from cosmic noise. In this situation, we follow Kierkegaard himself in seeking a renewed 
sense of God as speaking through a deepening of the experience of silence and (to paraphrase 
T. S. Eliot) thereby purifying the quality of our attention. But is this enough for us to speak of 
‘hearing’ God?  
A parallel venture seems to be found in Heidegger’s resort to ‘calling’ as a means of 
renewing philosophical enquiry. Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger summons us to a deeper 
attention to the calling that is given in the very structure of human Dasein. However, in Being 
and Time, this call (described as the call of conscience) seems to imply no caller and no 
specific content other than that which is given to it by Dasein itself. But if there is no one 
who calls, then the very idea of calling seems to have been reduced to an empty metaphor. 
This model seems to be changed in Heidegger’s later treatment of poetic vocation. Here it 
seems as if we are really talking about vocation, as in the Hölderlinian image of the poet as 
one called by the gods. However, a closer analysis shows that here too calling is a way of 
																																																						
1 I have developed the themes in this paper with wider reference to further aspects of Scripture, philosophy of 
language, ethics, and prosaics in my A Rhetorics of the Word. A Philosophy of Christian Life Part 2 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019). 
	 2	
speaking about human beings’ abandonment and that we have no basis to suppose that our 
sense of being called implies the existence of one who calls. 
The paper concludes, then, that whilst both Kierkegaard and Heidegger seem to offer 
a certain rediscovery of the sense of calling, this may be anthropologically suggestive, but of 
itself it does not go far enough to justify or to reinstate a fully theological idea of vocation. 
 
Calling in Scripture and Tradition 
 
‘Samuel, Samuel!’ As in God’s first call to the child Samuel (1 Sam 3.4), it is often the case 
that the divine approach takes the form of verbal address. This seems appropriate when the 
prophetic task is itself the delivery of a word from God to the people. At the same time, the 
Hebrew Bible testifies to a range of divine communicative practices, from the burning bush, 
through Amos's almond branch, to Daniel’s dreams and visions. Yet whatever their form their 
primary function is to be the occasion for articulating a 'word of the Lord'. The issue then is 
how we are to listen that we might hear – and hearing understand – that word.  
In the course of Christian history, however, this biblical emphasis on the word seems 
to have been lost or, at least, diminished in favour of a more pronounced emphasis on vision. 
From the early Church through to the modern period, the literature of Christian spirituality 
has repeatedly privileged vision as the ultimate mode in which human beings might know 
God. Thus, the question that engages Thomas Aquinas is whether it is possible to have a 
vision of God, visio Dei, in this life; and although he concludes that it is not, it is just such a 
vision of God that will make up the content of our final fulfilment in heaven. Of course, this 
visual emphasis is already implicit in the New Testament, as when Paul writes that we see 
God now in an obscure reflection ('as in a glass, darkly') but will then see face to face (1 Cor. 
13.12) or when the visible radiance of the divine glory is highlighted in the story of the 
Transfiguration. However, this visualizing tendency is extended in the ascetic literature of the 
early Church, in which the goal  of Christian spiritual life is contemplation, translating the 
Greek theoria. In other words, the goal of Christian asceticism is, simply, to contemplate or 
to gaze upon God to the extent that such a thing is possible for human beings in this life. This 
both reflects and enhances the influence of  earlier Greek, especially Platonic, conceptions of 
the philosophical ascent from the confused shadows of sense-experience towards a direct 
vision of the sun of divine truth. Even when the limits of vision were acknowledged, these 
could themselves be dealt with in visual imagery, as when Dionysius speaks of the 'dazzling 
darkness' of the divine presence. 
	 3	
This is not to say that vision monopolized the field of spiritual practice. In addition to 
a continuing (but now minority) emphasis on vision, ‘taste’ was another sense popular in 
ascetic theology, often associated with the false etymology that connected the Latin sapor, 
savour, with sapientia, wisdom. In the modern period, this transmutes also into 'feeling', as in 
Schleiermacher's Second Speech on religion, or, as Schleiermacher himself specifies, that 
moment in mental life that is prior to the split between feeling and intuition and that is 
described as 'a taste for the infinite' or a ‘music’ that should accompany life. Also often 
favoured was touch, not least in the especially intimate form of touch experienced in kissing, 
a key element in mystical interpretations of the Song of Songs, one of the most important 
biblical points of reference for medieval spiritual practice.  
We should not suppose that these were mutually exclusive. The ecstatic experience 
that Augustine shared with his mother Monica at Ostia seems to have involved both visionary 
and gustatory elements. As he writes 'Yes, we soared higher yet, by inward musing, and 
discoursing upon thee, and by admiring of thy works; and last of all, we came to our own 
souls, which we presently went beyond, so that we advanced as high as that region of never-
wasting plenty, whence thou feedest Israel for ever with the food of truth, and where life is 
that wisdom by which all these things are made, both which have been and which are to 
come'.2 Also striking in this passage is that it seems to echo the Platonic ascent described in 
Phaedrus, in which the souls that reach the highest level of spiritual vision are also described 
as feeding: 'There abides the very being with which true knowledge is concerned; the 
colourless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul. The divine 
intelligence, being nurtured upon mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every 
soul which is capable of receiving the food proper to it, rejoices at beholding reality, and once 
more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution of the worlds 
brings her round again to the same place.'3 
However we evaluate these images of spiritual sensation, they all seem to set a limit 
to the powers of language with regard to knowledge of God. Gregory of Nyssa’s (332-95) 
Life of Moses offers a particularly telling comment on this. Like other mystical interpretations 
of scripture (including that of Dionysius), Gregory figures Moses’ ascent of Mount Sinai as 
an allegory of the soul’s ascent to knowledge of God. Accordingly, he writes: ‘For leaving 
behind everything that is observed, not only what sense comprehends but also what the 
intelligence thinks it sees, it keeps on penetrating deeper until by the intelligence’s yearning it 
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3 Plato, Phaedrus, 247.3.c-d. 
	 4	
gains access to the invisible and incomprehensible, and there it sees God. This is the true 
knowledge of what is sought; this is the seeing that is not seeing, because that which is sought 
transcends all knowledge, being separated on all sides by a kind of darkness’.4 To which he 
adds ‘When Moses arrived there, he was taught by word what he had formerly learned from 
darkness, so that. I think, the doctrine on this matter ought to be made firmer for us being 
testified to by the divine voice’.5 The point could scarcely be made more clearly, namely, that 
the word is essentially ancillary to vision and that it is vision, even the kind of vision that is 
‘not seeing’ that is primary. 
‘Vision’ is not the sole metaphor in the Christian mystics’ thesaurus. Another is taste 
or even smell and a much used etymology connects the Latin sapientia (wisdom, as in ‘divine 
wisdom’) with sapor (savour or scent). But whether it is a matter of vision, touch, taste, or 
smell, it seems that God is beyond language. This is a key element in traditions of negative or 
apophatic theology as well as relating to a penchant for silence in spiritual writing. These 
(negative theology and silence) may have a certain affinity but they are not identical.6 
Negative theology is, after all, still an operation on and in language whereas silence is, quite 
simply, the suspension of language and, qua silence, is experienced as a sufficient and 
appropriate response to God. And it is on silence that I wish to concentrate here. 
François de Sales illustrates the point when he speaks of the divine and human lovers 
just being together in the secret, wordless enjoyment of each other’s being.7 In itself there is 
nothing 'negative' or apophatic about this. Still less does it imply the absence or non-presence 
of God, a major theme of recent discussions of negative theology. On the contrary, if negative 
theology is taken as indicative of the impossibility of divine presence, the lovers’ silence 
assumes the reality of presence. It is because they are present to each other that they no 
longer need to speak. ‘Love does not speak only with the tongue,’ writes de Sales, ‘but also 
with the eyes, with sighs, and in the face’.8 
																																																						
4 Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, trans. A. J. Malherbe and E. Ferguson (New York: Paulist Press, 1978) 
5 Ibid. 
6 The tendency to conflate silence and apophaticism is evident in the title and several of the essays in Oliver 
Davies and Denys Turner (eds.) Silence and the Word. Negative Theology and Incarnation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
7 A useful anthology on the theme of silence is William Franke’s two-volume On What Cannot be Said : 
Apophatic discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature, and the Arts. Volume 1, Classic Formulations, 
Volume 2, Modern and Contemporary Transformations (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2007). As 
Franke points out, silence does not only cover the kind of wondering adoration we are considering here, but may 
also relate to situations of God’s experienced absence, as in the poetry of Paul Celan. Such silence is also a 
theme in the poetry of the Welsh poet R. S. Thomas. See Richard MacLauchlan, Saturday’s Silence. R. S. 
Thomas and Paschal Reading (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2016) for an illuminating discussion. 
8 François de Sales, Traitté de l’amour de Dieu in Œuvres de Saint François de Sales, vol. 4 (Annecy: Niérat, 
1894), 6.1. 
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 It is tempting to interpret this being together of the human and divine lovers as a kind 
of experience, along the lines of the ineffable experience of God of which James so 
eloquently spoke. However, de Sales himself also draws attention to aspects of this being 
together that do not entirely fit the Jamesian model. What is decisive is the conformity of will 
between divine and human so that the main thing is the simple will to do or to live in accord 
with the will of God, the desire to desire what God desires, whether or not this is 
accompanied by any particular experience or feeling. In this spirit de Sales recommends to 
Philothea (the addressee of his Introduction to the Devout Life) that she remembers the 
teaching of Angela of Foligno that the prayer that is most acceptable to God is the prayer that 
we don’t want to pray, that arouses no pleasure, that we make ourselves pray, and that we 
pray solely because we know it is pleasing to God.9  
An eloquent illustration of this is de Sales' own parable of the deaf lutanist.	Imagine, 
he says, that there was once a supremely gifted lutanist and singer, so renowned that he is 
summoned by his prince to play and sing for the royal pleasure. As a true subject, nothing 
gives him greater joy than to dedicate the service of his gift to the prince. However, as time 
goes on he becomes so completely deaf that he himself can no longer hear the music he 
performs. Nevertheless, he continues to be rejoice in the fact that by singing and playing he is 
able to give pleasure to his prince. But now the prince decides to amuse himself hunting. 
Still, as he sets out, he commands the musician to continue singing and playing, even in his 
absence. Now the musician can no longer hear the music he makes, nor is the one for whom 
he is playing there to hear it. And yet his joy undiminished since, even though no one hears, 
he is doing all that he has ever wished to do, namely, to be faithful to his Lord’s will.10 
Silence, in this perspective, would seem to mean essentially and primarily the simple 
acceptance of the divine will that is also, implicitly, the simple acceptance of oneself, as one 
is, as (in a believer's perspective) God made one to be. But does this then mean that language 
has become entirely otiose? 
 Fénelon, a spiritual writer strongly influenced by de Sales and endorsing the main 
points of Salesian spirituality, spoke explicitly of the ‘inner word’. ‘It is certain’, he says, 
‘that the Spirit of God dwells within us, there acts, there prays without ceasing, there desires, 
there asks what we ourselves don’t know to ask, pushes us, animates us, speaks to us in the 
silence, suggesting all truth to us, uniting us in such a way to him that we are of but one spirit 
																																																						
9 François de Sales, trans. Michael Day, Introduction to the Devout Life (London: Burns and Oates, 1962), 4.14. 
10 François de Sales, Traitté de l’amour, 9.9. 
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with God’.11 A recent commentator, Mino Bergamo, has suggested that this teaching on the 
inner word is the decisive contribution of the 17th century 'French School'.12 
 Of course, this was not an entirely novel doctrine and if Christian spiritual writing of 
earlier centuries spoke of the vision of God or the kiss of God it is also rich in dialogues 
between the soul and God. Yet there may be significant cultural reasons for why, just at this 
time when Cartesianism becomes established as a key to the new science, religious thought 
turns away from vision and intuition to other ways of modelling the divine-human 
relationship, amongst them the 'inner word'. 
 Now Fenelon does not suppose that this inner word speaks to us in the same way that 
the Word of the Lord came to Isaiah, Jeremiah and the other prophets with verbal formulae 
that the prophets were to repeat to the people. To become capable of hearing this word we 
must bring about a transformation of the self. As Fenelon writes ‘we must quieten ourselves 
so as to listen in the profound silence of the entire soul this ineffable voice of the bride. We 
must lend our ears, since it is a sweet and delicate voice which is heard only by those who no 
longer hear the rest’, i.e., all the other voices by which the world engages our attention, 
seduces, and diverts us away from the way of devotion.13 Nor will we hear it if we 
immediately set about translating what it is saying into some rationally-ordered discourse. 
God speaks to the enlightened, the savants, not less than to the rest of us, but they are prone 
‘to turn everything into reason, one has recourse to the principles of natural wisdom and the 
methods of prudence, of everything except what would come to us in an infinitely better way 
by means of simplicity and docility towards the Spirit of God’. ‘We know everything—but 
without knowing anything’, as Fénelon comments.14 
 Perhaps, after all, this 'inner word' is itself only a metaphor for what is better 
described in terms of feeling? But what is exactly at stake here? Why should it matter 
whether divine reality is primarily revealed to us as word, flavour, or vision? Does whichever 
mode of relationship we privilege really affect the fundamental philosophical issues 
regarding the possibility of human beings having a God-relationship? Don't the same 
polarities of created/ uncreated, finite/ infinite, conditioned/ unconditioned, temporal/ eternal 
come into play in each case, bringing with them the same perennial and insoluble problems? 
																																																						
11 François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon, (ed. J. Le Brun),  Oeuvres (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), vol. 1, pp. 
589-90. 
12 Mino Bergamo, L’anatomia dell’anima da François de Sales à Fénelon (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991), p. 13. 
13 Fénelon, Œuvres, vol. 1, p. 590. 
14 Fénelon, Œuvres, vol. 1, p. 594. 
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What, if anything, is distinctive about the ‘word’ character of divine communication in 
comparison with touch, taste, or vision? 
 One obvious answer is that the word, language, is precisely the way in which human 
beings develop, articulate, and communicate their understanding of themselves and their 
world. Another, closely related to this, is that language is a means of communication unique 
to and distinctive of personal beings. When I speak, I suppose that the one to whom I am 
speaking is one capable of hearing and understanding what I am saying; likewise, when I hear 
something being said to me, I suppose that the source of that saying is also a personal being 
such as I believe myself to be. The identification of ‘word’ as the category of divine 
communication par excellence is therefore an implicit affirmation of the claim that the God 
with whom we have to do in spiritual life is a personal God (whatever we more precisely 
mean by that). 
 However, although there have been influential currents of modern theology that have 
their point of departure in the Word of God ( as in Karl Barth’s ‘theology of the Word of 
God’), it seems that the dominant experience of modernity implies the absence or 
unintelligibility of such a Word. This is indirectly acknowledged by Barthian theology’s own 
insistence that the divine Word is indeed unintelligible in terms of worldly criteria of 
meaningfulness. Although such theologies have attracted their supporters, it seems also 
worthwhile to see what, if anything, in the modern experience might make it possible for us 
to understand ourselves as ‘hearers of the Word’. I shall therefore dedicate the remainder of 
this paper to looking at what that means ex negativo, specifically by exploring what we can 
learn about the ‘word’ character of divine communication from those experiences of God or 
of ultimate reality that are marked not by speech but by silence. In particular I shall focus on 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger, two thinkers whose reception became deeply intertwined in the 
mid-twentieth century. As elsewhere, what they say on this question reveals significant 
shared horizons but no less significant divergences, especially with regard to the destiny of 
Christianity in the modern world. Both, as we shall see, emphasize the category of calling as 
a fundamental anthropological feature, but both leave unresolved the question as what or who 
is calling. 
 
Language and Silence in Kierkegaard 
We can learn something of what is at stake here from Kierkegaard’s essay  'Shadowgraphs'. 
Here he has his unnamed aesthetic writer A address his fellow ‘symparanekromenoi’ as 
follows.  
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... let us keep quiet for a moment and listen to the music of the storm, its impudent 
course, its bold summons, and to the defiant bellow of the sea, the wood’s anxious 
sighs, the trees’ despairing crashing, and the grass’s cowardly whisper? People rightly 
say that the divine voice is not in the rushing wind but in the gentle breeze—but our 
ears are not formed to catch gentle breezes; instead they are [formed] to drink up 
elemental noise. And why should [the storm] not break forth more powerfully still and 
make an end of life and of the world and of this short speech, which has at least the 
advantage over all the rest that it soon comes to an end.15   
This philosophy postulates the origin of the world in a blind and purposeless vortex, a 
restatement of ancient atomism in post-Romantic mood  in which all there really is beyond 
the tapestry of  human speech is ‘elemental noise’. The world is essentially ‘silent’, word-
less, in the specific sense that no matter how much ever gets said none of it means anything at 
all—sound and fury signifying silence. This lack of fundamental meaning is most 
immediately and evidently present in the ineluctable death to which all life, inclusive of all 
human life, irreversibly tends.  
And if the Kierkegaardian aesthete presents this vision in a way that exerts a certain 
seductive fascination, the later development of his authorship suggests that a similar nihilism 
lies behind the average everydayness of modern petit bourgeois life. In the 1846 analysis of 
‘The Present Age’, Kierkegaard characterizes this age in terms of its all-encompassing 
‘chatter’, a non-stop stream of spoken and printed words dragging discourse towards ever 
greater formlessness, superficiality, and the levelling out of all substantial differences and 
distinctions. ‘And just as the public is a pure abstraction so too will human speech finally 
become [an abstraction]. There will no longer be anyone who talks but an objective reflection 
will gradually produce an atmospheric something, an abstract noise that will make all human 
speech superfluous, just as machines make workers superfluous.’16 And if the Kierkegaardian 
aesthete enjoys a kind of rapture of the abyss, the chatterers ‘dread the moment of silence that 
will reveal the emptiness’, that is, reveal the fact that, in the end, they have nothing really to 
say for themselves.17  
On this view, both the aesthetes and the modern bourgeois live in  a world that is 
ultimately silent, a world in which whoever or whatever God may be, He is not a God who 
																																																						
15 Søren Kierkegaard, Enten-Eller 1 in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vol. 2, (Copenhagen: Gad, 1997), p. 166; 
trans. H. V. and E. H. Hong, Either/Or I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 168. 
16 Søren Kierkegaard, En Literair Anmeldelse in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vol. 8 (Copenhagen: Gad, 2004), 
pp. 98-9; trans. H. V. and E. H. Hong, Two Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 104. 
17 Ibid., p. 93 (E. Trans., p. 98). 
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speaks - or not in such a way that human beings can understand. But as in the logic that 
declares despair to be the only antidote to despair, the most effective antidote to an age that is 
marked by metaphysical silence is to become silent, a strategy that Kierkegaard addresses 
most fully in an 1849 discourse entitled, simply, 'Silence', a discourse that offers further 
variations on his now well-established theme of the lilies and the birds.  
Kierkegaard begins by acknowledging the difficulty of relating to God in the mode of 
speech, not least when we, like everybody else, are habitual 'chatterers': 
God is in heaven and we are on earth and therefore we cannot easily talk together. 
God is love and human beings—as one says to a child and maybe even for its 
benefit—are little rascals, therefore they cannot easily talk together. …  The person 
who knows how to pray knows this and those who don’t know how to pray might 
perhaps learn this by praying. Perhaps there was something that was very much on 
your mind, something that was so important to you, something that made it so 
pressing for you to explain yourself to God that it made you afraid of forgetting some 
detail and then, if you had forgotten anything, you were afraid that God would not 
Himself be able to remember it—and so you focused your mind on praying with real 
inwardness. And what happened then, if you did indeed pray with real inwardness? 
Something wonderful. For as you prayed more and more inwardly, you had less and 
less to say, and finally you became entirely silent. You became silent and, if it is 
possible that there is something even more opposed to speaking than silence, you 
became a listener. You had thought that praying was about speaking: you learned that 
praying is not merely keeping silent but is listening. That is how it is. Praying is not 
listening to oneself speak, but is about becoming silent and, in becoming silent, 
waiting, until the one who prays hears God.18  
Practically, Kierkegaard suggests that a first step towards learning silence might be to 
go out into nature and to be alone with the 'lilies and the birds' referred to in the Sermon on 
the Mount, away from the city, away from the crowd and its endless chatter. Is, this, then a 
Christian reworking of a Romantic nature philosophy: is it to nature and to its ‘thousand 
voices’ that we are to attend when we have grown silent? Is it nature’s own silence that we 
are here engaged in interiorizing? But if this is so, what then is the difference between this 
‘godly’ approach to nature’s silence and that of the aesthete? Why should we find anything in 
																																																						
18 Søren Kierkegaard, Lilien paa Marken og Fuglen under Himlen in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vol. 11 
(Copenhagen: Gad, 2006), p. 17; E. trans.from G. Pattison, ed. and trans. Kierkegaard’s Spiritual Writings (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2010), p. 185. 
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nature other than 'elemental noise', even if perhaps very beautiful elemental noise? The 
difference is that it is neither to the voice of nature nor to the silence of nature that we are to 
listen when we have once arrived ‘out there’. Silence is indeed everywhere in nature.  As 
Kierkegaard writes 
Out there it is silent, and not only when everything falls silent in the silence of night 
but also when the day is stirring as through a thousand chords and everything is like 
an ocean of sound, even then it is silent out there. Every single creature plays its part 
so well that not one of them, not all of them together, disturb this solemn silence. Out 
there it is silent. The wood is silent—and even when it whispers, it is silent. Even 
where the trees are most thickly clustered together they keep their word to each other 
and keep what is said to themselves … The sea is silent—and even when it roars and 
is full of noise it is nevertheless silent …19  
Yet this silence reveals something that is neither mere silence nor speech, namely, the 
silence of the creature in a relation of adoration vis-à-vis its creator. 
[W]hat does this silence express? It expresses reverence for God and the fact that He 
is the One who governs and it is to Him alone that wisdom and understanding belong. 
And it is precisely because this silence reverences God and, in a manner proper to 
nature, worships Him, that it is so solemn. And it is because this silence is thus 
solemn that it is possible to sense God in nature—and so it is no wonder that 
everything keeps silent out of reverence for Him. Even if He does not speak, the fact 
that everything keeps silent out of reverence for Him affects one as if He were 
speaking.20  
At this point we note that there is a difference between silence and silence, a 
difference well-observed by Jean-Louis Chrétien when he notes that there is a radical 
difference between the silence of the philosophical mystic in face of the impersonal absolute 
and the silence of the believer waiting on a God who, it is supposed, has something to say, a 
God to whom speech, the Word, is not alien. The silence of the devout Christian is, on this 
understanding, a silence of listening and attention--and perhaps (we may add) an appropriate 
mode of response.21 In these terms, Kierkegaard's silence is not a matter of language in 
favour of the silence of nature but of using the silence of nature to become capable of hearing 
and speaking at another level.  
																																																						
19 Kierkegaard, Lilien paa Marken, pp. 18-9 (E. trans., pp. 186-7). 
20 Kierkegaard, Lilien paa Marken, p. 22 (E. trans. p. 191). 
21 See J.-L. Chrétien, tr. A. Brown, The Ark of Speech (London: Routledge, 2004), 39.  
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And, in silence, may [the gospel] lead you to forget yourself, forget what you yourself 
are called, forget your own name, whether it is a renowned or an ignominious or an 
insignificant name, in order silently to pray to God, ‘hallowed be Your name’! And, in 
silence, may it bring you to forget yourself, your plans, whether they are great 
schemes that encompass everything or so narrow as only to concern yourself and your 
future, in order to silently pray to God, ‘Your Kingdom come’. And, in silence, may it 
bring you to forget your will, your willfulness, in order to silently pray ‘Your will be 
done’22 
 Silence issues in a word, in this case the word of prayer that we know as the Lord's 
Prayer. If a certain model of Christian contemplation moves from verbal prayer to mental 
prayer to silence, the movement of Kierkegaardian prayer is nearly the opposite as it moves 
from silence to being able to speak to and, I suggest, with God.  
 Yet we should not be too literal. It is not a question of filling the silence with words. 
In the context of language, silence itself is significant, a part of speech, like De Sales lovers, 
alone on silent understanding. This is a point well made by Thomas Merton, one of the most 
influential spiritual writers in the modern Catholic traditions. Merton writes:  
The true contemplative is not the one who prepares his mind for a particular message 
that he wants or expects to hear, but who remains empty because he knows that he can 
never expect or anticipate the word that will transform his darkness into light. He does 
not even anticipate a special kind of transformation. He does not demand light instead 
of darkness. He waits on the Word of God in silence, and when he is “answered,” it is 
not so much by a word that bursts into his silence. It is by his silence itself suddenly, 
inexplicably revealing itself to him as a word of great power, full of the voice of 
God.23 
 In these terms, we need not expect the inner voice to have the character of an 
audition; it may just be a quality of silence that, nevertheless, 'speaks' to us with the character 
of address. But whether it reaches us as an audition ('Samuel, Samuel ...') or as a silence to 
which we find ourselves summoned to attend, the possibility of the inner dialogue with God 
depends, crucially, on our being called. In other words, if this is to be indeed a dialogue with 
God and not simply a way of shielding ourselves from the horror of the elemental noise of an 
entirely indifferent universe, the word cannot come from nowhere. It must—even if only in 
																																																						
22 Kierkegaard, Lilien paa Marken, p. 24. 
23 Thomas Merton, Contemplative Prayer (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1973), p. 112. 
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the mode of silence—be spoken. And, no less importantly, we must know how to listen so as 
to hear it 
 Yet, as some of what we have heard from Kierkegaard implies, none of this is simply 
a matter of personal preference or self-cultivation. Our capacity for language and our relation 
to silence are matters in which we find ourselves orientated if not determined by the overall 
character of the age in which we live. As children of an age of chatter, our ability to listen is 
likely to be severely atrophied. Even if God is speaking, we may not be able to hear. It is this 
logic that drives Kierkegaard’s idea of faith in the direction of a radically individualized act, 
separating believers from their contemporaries and making what they say about faith 
incomprehensible to them. Can we, then, find a model that does not require such radical 
separation? Can we experience ourselves as radically called but also, in our calling, called not 
only to share but also to transform the destiny of our generation?   
 It is in search of such a model that we  turn now to Heidegger, who, I think offers a 
number of crucial insights into the idea of calling but also into the complex of issues around 
human existence, nature, language and God—although it is crucial to Heidegger’s conception 
of philosophy that these insights come in the form of a still more radical questioning and not 
as answers. 
The notion of call or calling is in fact a persistent theme in Heidegger’s thinking, from 
long before Being and Time and on into his later, post–World War II thinking. Let us hear 
again a passage from one of the letters to Elfride, from 1918: 
Instead of leading to a pure, empty ‘I’ the whole problem of the ‘I’ leads to the fulfilled 
and primordially living [‘I’] and its constituent elements – the fulfilling of values 
grounded in essential openness to value, pointing back to the essence of personal Spirit 
that I have apprehended as ‘Vocation’ (Berufung) – only so do the eternal properties of 
the Spirit and their absolute confusion become conceivable – it is along these lines that 
the problems upon which I have hit while out here are moving, the carrying through of 
the principle of the historical consciousness – …24 
In the following years phrases such as ‘the essence of eternal Spirit’ and ‘the eternal 
properties of the Spirit’ disappear from Heidegger’s vocabulary and have no role in Being 
and Time. Yet the notion of vocation, of the ‘I’ as primordially ‘called’ remains and comes to 
play a central and abiding role, most obviously in the discussion of conscience in Being and 
Time as well as in his later development. 
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But, as Heidegger himself asks, who exactly is it that calls when we feel ourselves 
called by conscience? On some theological and philosophical accounts it might be the voice 
of God or of reason, my ‘true self’ that invisibly presides over my every action. For 
Heidegger, however, God has been methodologically ruled out and, insofar as he might be 
prepared to talk of a ‘true self’ at all in Being and Time, this could only be the self that I am 
called, in conscience, to become – not an ‘essential’ self that somehow already exists in some 
ideal or metaphysical dimension of my being. That is to say, it is not so much the self that I 
am (present tense) but more the self that I am not-yet but must first become through 
resolutely running towards death. So who or what calls? His answer: ‘“It” calls, against our 
expectations and even against our will …. The call comes from me and yet from beyond 
me.’25 And, as he elaborates, 
The caller is Dasein in its state of homelessness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world 
as the “not-at-home” – the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the ‘nothing’ of the world. The caller is 
unfamiliar to the everyday they–self; it is something like an alien voice. What could be 
more alien to the “they”, lost in the manifold ‘world’ of its concern, than the self which 
has been individualized down to itself in its state of homelessness and thrown into the 
“nothing”? 26 
What ‘calls’ is the bare realization of the utter destitution, ontological homelessness, 
and solitude of the self as thrown towards death. What calls, in other words, is, simply, the 
truth of the human condition, when all the pleasant or terrifying masks of average 
everydayness have been stripped away. This is what we are called to see and it is in the light 
of this truth that we are ‘called’ to live. But, in this case, 'calling' is, in the end, a mere 
metaphor and, it seems, we have not really advanced beyond the position of Kierkegaard's 
aesthete: deep down the world does not reveal itself in word but in elemental noise that we 
only interpret, for our own use and our own purposes, as word. But is this Heidegger's own 
final word? 
From the early 1930s onwards the idea of the poetic and the figure of the poet, above 
all the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, become recurrent foci in Heidegger's thinking. Distancing his 
own understanding of the poetic from contemporary ideas about how the creative artist 
‘expresses’ deep inner experiences,27 Heidegger looks for the essence of the poetic in the 
nature of the poetic word. Heidegger's poet is the one in whose word the essence of language 
																																																						
25 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993), p. 275; E. trans. E. Robinson and J. 
Macquarrie, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 320. 
26 Heidegger, Sein un Zeit, p. 277/ Being and Time, pp. 321-2. 
27 See my Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to the Later Heidegger (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 78–83. 
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(Sprache) is pre-eminently manifest and therefore also the one in whose word the being of 
human being is itself revealed in a distinctive and eminent degree. However, this is not the 
result of anything subjective or some innate genius but results from the poet having been 
gripped by the encompassing power of beings themselves. Versus Romanticism, the poet is 
not a ‘creator’ but exists poetically as one who is called. 
The structure and implications of such poetic calling are especially clearly developed in 
Heidegger’s 1942 lectures on Hölderlin’s poem ‘The Ister’ (from the Greek name for the 
lower Danube, Istros). The poem opens with the poet’s invocation to the rising sun: ‘Now 
come, Fire!/ We are desirous/ Of seeing the day’. Heidegger immediately draws attention to 
the meaning of the call articulated in these few simple words. ‘[T]his calling’, he says, ‘is 
different from the issuing of any high-handed summons or command’28 since 
The call simultaneously calls upon that which is called, such invocation attesting to the 
dignity of that which is called upon. Here that which is to come comes of its own 
accord. It is not the call that first moves that which is coming to its coming. Yet if ‘the 
fire’ comes of its own accord, then why is it called? The call does not effect the 
coming. Yet it calls something to that which is coming. What does it call to it?29 
In answer to this question Heidegger directs us to the second and third lines of the 
poem (‘We are desirous/ Of seeing the day’), in which the poet speaks of his and his 
audience’s desire to see the coming day. Heidegger interprets this in the sense of the poet 
speaking on behalf of or as the voice of those who await the coming of the sun to say that 
they are now ready. But, he adds, they are ready ‘only because [they] are called by the 
coming fire itself’. That is to say, their readiness to greet the day is not a spontaneous 
manifestation of their inner life but is possible only because they know themselves called to 
welcome the day, ‘called by the coming fire itself’. Consequently, ‘the ones calling here are 
those who are called, those who are called upon … those summoned to hear because they are 
of such a vocation’30 – that is, the vocation of the poetic word itself. ‘Only those called to a 
calling can truly call: “come”. And this calling that is called alone has a proper necessity to 
it’. And, as such, ‘This call remains infinitely distinct from what we name a blindly uttered 
cry’.31 Such a poetic calling, in which we are called so as to become capable of calling upon, 
is paradigmatic for the primordial event of the arising of language as distinct from the 
																																																						
28 M. Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymne “Der Ister”. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 53 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1993 [2nd ed.]), pp. 5-6; E., trans. W. McNeill and J. Davis, Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 6.  
29 Heidegger, “Der Ister”, pp. 5-6; E. trans. p. 6. 
30Heidegger, “Der Ister”, p. 6; E. trans., p. 7. 
31 Heidegger, “Der Ister”, p. 7; E. trans., p. 8.  
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utterance of a mere cry. But such an arising of language is in turn inseparable from the event 
of the arising of the human: in the moment in which the cry becomes a word, the animal 
becomes human. As Heidegger’s closing pages emphasize, the poet is therefore the one who, 
through his word, creates a place for human dwelling on earth.32 But although the poet and 
the poetic word thus acquire a privileged status in Heidegger’s thought, it is important to 
emphasize again that what is revealed in poetic discourse is the power of the word as such, 
that is, the power that brings human being itself into the light of self-awareness and, in doing 
so, makes us truly human – ‘us’ as in ‘all of us’ and not just the privileged creator-self of 
Fichtean Romanticism. 
The philosophical point that language demands our being able to listen to what calls to 
us from beyond our subjective ‘I’ is developed more formally in the 1957 lecture on ‘The 
Principle of Identity’, where, rejecting the Fichtean formulation of the principle of the 
identity of thought and being, A=A, Heidegger argues that, nevertheless, human thinking 
belongs to being and does so precisely by virtue of our capacity to listen to being and thus to 
hear it. Heidegger’s move here – from identity to belonging – is predicated on the metaphoric 
(but not merely metaphoric) force of the German word translated here as ‘to belong’, 
gehören, incorporating the verb hören, to hear. Human beings belong to being by hearing it. 
The following passage from the lecture merits being read against the background of the 
commentary on poetic vocation in ‘The Ister’: 
 To ‘belong’ [to be one who listens] here still means to be in the order of Being. But 
 man’s distinctive feature lies in this, that he, as one who thinks, is open to Being, face 
 to face with being; thus man remains referred to being and so answers to [literally: 
 ‘speaks out from’ or ‘corresponds to’: entspricht] Being, and he is only this. This 
 ‘only’ does not mean a limitation, but rather an excess. A belonging to Being prevails 
 within man, a belonging which listens to Being because it is appropriated to Being.33 
But how does this relate to the question as to whether, deep down, being is to be 
characterized by elemental noise or is truly revealed for what and as it is in the word? In 
Being and Time, it seemed that all that called was, in the end, death, and the question of death 
continues to provide a measure of Heidegger's understanding of the human, even if his later 
thought develops this very differently and more poetically than in Being and Time. 
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A clear example of this is in the Introduction to Metaphysics (1935), in which 
Heidegger addresses the question of being under a sequence of headings: being and 
becoming, being and appearance, being and thinking, and being and ‘the ought’. In the 
section on being and thinking, he takes his listeners back to the first chorus from Sophocles’ 
Antigone, a poetic reflection on the mystery of human existence. In one widely used English 
translation this opens with the lines ‘Wonders are many on earth, and the greatest of these is 
man’.34 Heidegger’s own translation strikes a rather different tone: ‘Manifold is the uncanny 
[Unheimliche]; yet nothing more uncanny bestirs itself with greater fury than the human’.35 
Heidegger’s ‘uncanny’ echoes what we have already heard from Being and Time about the 
uncanniness of human existence in its thrownness towards death. Human existence is 
uncanny/unheimlich because it lacks a sense of being at home, in the specific sense that 
human beings are ontologically homeless in the world and have neither a ‘home’ nor an 
abiding dwelling on earth. So too here. It is precisely the dislocation of human existence that 
Heidegger hears in Sophocles’ poem, as it describes human beings’ ability to transcend any 
purely given environment, subordinating the earth, traversing land and sea, mastering the 
animal world. But, both in the poem and in Heidegger’s interpretation, this ‘uncanny’ power 
is exemplified not only in human beings’ physical dominion over the earth but also, pre-
eminently, in the human capacity for language. Although we may have dominion over ocean, 
earth, and animal, we would never be conscious of what this dominion meant and we would 
never know the ocean as ocean, the earth as earth, or the animal as animal without ‘the 
powers of language, understanding, attunement and building’. In other words, these latter 
powers (bestowed in and through language) are themselves the conditions of our wider 
dominion over the earth. This leads Heidegger to speak of poetic discourse as an ‘exercise of 
force’ (Gewalttätigkeit – which we could also translate as ‘violence’), which he explains as 
the ‘binding and connecting of the forces by means of which beings disclose themselves as 
such when human beings step forward into their domain’.36 Human beings’ homelessness, 
their not being bound to any one place or any one environment, is also their power to reach 
out in action and understanding to any possible earthly environment. Uprooted from their 
place in ‘nature’ their ‘uncanny’ power seems to know no natural boundaries. 
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‘There is just one thing with regard to which their exercise of power is immediately 
frustrated’ however.37 And that, as Sophocles’ poem reminds us and Heidegger repeats, is 
death. But this is not an accidental feature of our existence nor even just a boundary at which 
we will arrive one day in the future. ‘Human beings are not only faced ineluctably by death 
when the time comes for them to die, but constantly and essentially’, Heidegger says.38 
‘Insofar as human beings are, they stand in relation to the ineluctability of death. Thus 
[human] being-there [Da-sein] is the happening of the un-canny [Un-heimlichkeit] itself …. 
In naming this power and this uncanniness the poetic word projects their proper boundaries to 
being and to the essence of being human’.39 Human beings, sovereign over everything else, 
are not sovereign over death. But, when it is uttered in the poetic word (or, perhaps more 
precisely, as a poetic word), death ceases to be a mere contingency affecting us from outside; 
even the boundary that death sets to life can then become a human ‘project’. This is because 
in the poetic word, which is the Ur-word of human language as such, we can ‘speak’ death 
and represent it in and as a human logos. Even as setting a limit to all human power, death 
becomes, through the poetic word, a human, humanizing, and humanized event. 
We return to Hölderlin and the question of poetic vocation. One – of several – passages 
that Heidegger sees as especially focussing the essence of the poetic vocation is from the 
poem ‘As on a Feast-Day’ (here in a prose translation): ‘Yet to us, Oh poets, is due the task 
of standing with uncovered heads beneath God’s thunder, taking in our hands the Father’s 
own ray, that very one, and offering the heavenly gift to the people, enclosed in song’. As 
Heidegger comments, ‘The poet forces and binds the divine lightning in a word and places 
this word, burdened with lightning, into the language of his people’.40  
This reveals a further dimension of the understanding of poetic vocation that we 
encountered in ‘The Ister’. There it was the rising sun that ‘called’ the poet to readiness; now 
it is the divine thunder and lightning. In these, as in other examples, the poetic task is 
intimately connected with the human mediation of nature. Nor is it coincidental in this 
connection that several of Heidegger’s lecture series focus on poems invoking the German 
land and the great rivers, the Rhine and the Danube, that moulded the land so as to make it a 
place in which the wandering Germanic tribes might dwell. The ‘divinity’ that speaks in the 
thunder and lightning is the divinity of the super-human powers manifest in the Alpine storms 
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that generate the torrents and lakes from which the great German rivers flow forth and that, in 
turn, form the earth into a habitable land for mortal dwelling – although, as Heidegger 
consistently emphasizes, it is only in the poetic naming of these powers that mortal dwelling 
becomes genuinely human. But, this all the more sharpens the question: who then calls in the 
calling? If we name thunder, lightning, and sun as divine or semi-divine powers, does that of 
itself make them a ‘who’? And for us moderns, who, as Heidegger also emphasizes (and 
precisely with reference to Hölderlin), have experienced the flight of the gods, does it really 
make any difference if we name these powers Zeus or Apollo? Is this not, dare we say, a 
‘merely poetical’ way of speaking of indifferent worldly powers that, in Matthew Arnold’s 
words, have ‘really neither joy, nor love, nor light,/ Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for 
pain’, i.e., elemental noise.41  
The intertwining of speech, silence, and suffering is revisited by Heidegger in his 1950 
lecture ‘Language’ (Die Sprache). This time, the text is Georg Trakl's poem 'On a Winter 
Evening'. The poem evokes a scene in which, on a snowy winter’s evening, as the vesper bell 
rings, a wanderer arrives at a well-lit house in which bread and wine are laid out on the table. 
Expounding the poem line by line, Heidegger comes to the words ‘Pain turned the threshold 
to stone’ (‘Schmerz versteinerte die Schwelle’), which, he says, enunciate the meaning of the 
poem as a whole. Why? Because the threshold is the dividing line between outside and 
inside, between the cold winter night and the welcoming brightness of the house with its 
simple yet festally decked table. ‘The threshold bears the “between”’, Heidegger writes.42 But 
what does this mean and what does it have to do with pain?  
Paraphrasing Heidegger, I suggest that his argument is as follows. Human beings exist 
in the world as conscious of their distinction from their environment, which can also be 
experienced as not being at home in it. This not-being-at-home in the world is itself an 
expression of the anxious realization of being thrown towards death and, right from the 
beginning of their lives, human beings are aware of themselves as being thrown beyond their 
world into annihilation. The threshold that separates the warmth and luminosity of the home 
from the cold night outside is thus essentially ambivalent. On the one hand, it offers those 
wandering in the night the possibility of welcome and it is precisely at the threshold, 
Heidegger says, that the ‘pure brightness’ of this welcome shines forth. Yet the threshold also 
marks the fact that the home is only a local and provisional possibility within the 
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encompassing night. For every ‘inside’ there is also an ‘outside’. Recognition of the threshold 
is thus also recollection of the ultimate limitations of the human situation. To put it at its 
simplest, no matter how deeply ‘at home’ we are in our world, the threshold is a constant 
reminder that a time will come when we will be carried over it for the last time, ‘feet first’. 
Yet even in the face of this 'ownmost possibility' of death the pure light of welcome spoken in 
the word, in this poetic word, summons our world and the things that compose it into their 
actual and specific form, giving us a world in which we can dwell. Bringing the turbulence of 
our world to rest, it gathers its manifold competing elements into articulate speech. But what 
in this way it calls to presence is what is otherwise unspoken, that is, what is essentially 
silent. So, in a much-quoted statement, Heidegger writes that ‘Language speaks as the re-
sonance of silence’ (‘das Geläut der Stille’).43 And, ‘Only in so far as human beings belong 
within the re-sonance of silence, are mortals capable, in their fashion, of resonant speech’.44 
But does any of this suggest to us that there is someone who calls in this ‘calling’? As 
when considering the silent call of conscience, the question inevitably arises as to whether 
there really is anything that ‘calls’ other than the compelling vision of our own mortality. 
Isn’t even poetic speaking – and perhaps especially poetic speaking – therefore also speaking 
that bears within itself and knows the pain of finitude and nothing more? And isn’t this still 
the case even if, qua poetry, it also bestows on that pain a form that enables us to bear it and 
even, as it is said, ‘rise above it’? But no matter how ‘poetic’, isn’t this, in the end, an 
essentially tragic view of life – even if it can inculcate in those who embrace it a certain quiet 
reverence for Being? Is it ultimately anything more than an ennobling of the animal fear of 
death by confronting it and saying ‘Yes’ to it? Such poetic Yea-saying may bestow a certain 
dignity on our vanishing existence, but to the question ‘What am I?’ does it really offer any 
other answer than the answer that Tennyson’s ‘In Memoriam’ sets out to refute: ‘An infant 
crying in the night:/ An infant crying for the light:/ And with no language but a cry’? 
A philosophy that neither claims nor calls upon religious faith may be content to 
humble itself under such self-knowledge and this is certainly not a contemptible position.45 
However, a Christian view of life will also want to speak of another possibility. For if 
Heidegger is right and we exist by virtue of a certain calling, we have to ask whether this can 
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this make any sense except on the basis of believing that we are called by one who is in some 
sense a personal being and, as such and only as such, is able to call us by name. This is 
equally true if we think of the call as admonishing (‘Adam, where art thou?’), as summoning 
to service (‘Samuel! Samuel!’), or as the call to worship (‘Hear, O Israel’)? How can we be 
called unless there is one who calls, unless there is a ‘who’ and not just an ‘It’? But whether 
with regard to the call of conscience or the divine thunder, Heidegger’s construal of the 
source of the call cannot be envisaged as a ‘who’. I have argued that Heidegger’s ‘god’ is not 
a god who speaks but a god who thunders and whose voice must be translated from a realm 
beyond that of humanity and human speech into the language of articulate discourse. And if 
the Hebrew Bible also speaks of a God who speaks in the thunder and the whirlwind, it never 
speaks of the thunder and the whirlwind as constituting the divine voice but only ever as that 
in which and out of which the divine voice speaks. 
 Of course, I do not imagine that in this paper I have justified the claim that the human 
God-relationship is indeed based on a divine call rather than being an invention of the 
pathetic fallacy. What I do hope to have done is to show how the phenomenological analyses 
of human existence by Kierkegaard and Heidegger show the meaningfulness of regarding 
human beings as hearers of the Word. This does not bring with it the claim as to any 
immediate intuition regarding the ultimately personal character of reality but, precisely as 
language, calls us to  to the responsibility of judgement. In this judgement we do not establish 
the truth about ourselves by asking 'What is out there?' but, instead, 'Who is calling?' 
